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Two types of speaker’s ignorance over the epistemic space in Korean 
Arum Kang & Suwon Yoon* 
Abstract. The main goal of this paper is to propose a novel paradigm of the split 
epistemic ignorance, based on two morphologically related particles in Korean: inka 
in wh-indefinites vs. nka in modalized questions. Previous literature assumes the 
interrogative-indefinite affinity as a reflex of a semantic relationship between 
interrogative markers and indefinites by introducing a set of propositional 
alternatives (Alternative Semantics: Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Alonso-Ovalle 
2006, a.o.). However, we challenge these claims by showing that inka and nka are 
distinct lexical items which are distributed in different clause types, hence, a new 
split for the ignorance system is called for. We propose the semantics under which 
inka and nka variants are relativized to the epistemic state of the speaker, M(i) 
(Giannakidou 1995 et seq.). In particular, we show that: (i) the common denominator 
of nka and inka is the fact that they both express the speaker’s epistemic 
indeterminacy; but (ii) the crucial difference arises from a strict dichotomy between 
the types of alternatives that nka and inka introduce, i.e., the propositional 
alternatives for nka vs. the individual alternatives for inka.  
Keywords. wh-indeterminates; modalized questions; anti-speciﬁcity; epistemic 
alternatives 
1. Introduction. In Modern Korean, the common denominator of the two morphologically
related particles, nka and inka, is that they both express the speaker’s epistemic indeterminacy. 
The particle inka combines with wh-words and conveys the inference that the speaker is unable 
to identify the precise referent in a given question: 
(1)  Nwukwu-inka wusungha-ess-ta. #Nwukwu-key? 
who-INKA  win-Past-Decl   who-Q 
‘Someone (I don’t know who he is) won. Guess who?’ 
Wh-inka is distinct from other mere existential expressions because it manifests referential 
deficiency. It never induces epistemically specific interpretations, as evidenced by the “guess 
who” test (Haspelmath 1997, Aloni and Port 2014), which requires a fixed value. We call wh-
inka an anti-specific indefinite because it is an indicator of the speaker’s epistemic uncertainty 
regarding the identity of the referent without having a fixed value.  
On the other hand, nka attaches at the end of the clause and marks the status of the speaker’s 
uncertain knowledge which maximally weakens her commitment to the truth of a proposition: 
(2)  a.   Con-i  wusungca-i-nka? 
John-Nom winner-be-NKA   
‘Is John possibly the winner?; Maybe John is the winner, or maybe not; John might 
be the winner.’           
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  you-Nom  winner-be-Q  
 ‘lit. Are you possibly a winner?’ 
Nka forms a non-factual question. The general purpose of an information-seeking question is for 
the speaker to receive a true answer from the addressee. When using nka, however, the question 
does not call for any response from the hearer, but only concerns itself with the speaker’s lack of 
knowledge as to the content of the proposition. We term the question in (2) a modalized question 
and nka is a marker of a modalized question. A modalized question (MQ) is not a question about 
factuality, but only about the possibility of the proposition. In this sense, MQs involve modal 
effects. The infelicity in (2b) confirms the modality: since it concerns the addressee herself, 
using nka is infelicitous in any situation where the hearer cannot be assumed to know the answer. 
In what follows, we show that inka and nka are distinct lexical items, and each phrase thus 
occurs in different clause types. 
The interrogative-indefinite affinity is found in many natural languages in which an identical 
morphological paradigm is employed for an interrogative marker and a wh-indefinite: e.g. oo in 
Malayalam (Jayaseelan 2001, 2008), ka in Japanese (Kuroda 1965; Hagstrom 1998), and wa in 
Yucatec Maya (Anderbois 2011, 2012). A number of morphosyntactic differences among the 
interrogative markers and also among the wh-indefinite markers suggest that this seemingly 
interrogative-indefinite affinity is a reflex of the semantic relation between the interrogative 
markers and the indefinites by introducing a set of propositional alternatives (Alternative 
Semantics: Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Alonso-Ovalle 2006, a.o.). However, we challenge 
these claims by showing that there is a novel paradigm of epistemic ignorance, which is not 
captured by means of propositional alternatives. Given this multifunctionality, the crucial 
question we must ask in connection with the variants between inka and nka is whether to simply 
posit two different meanings. If we pursue a unified analysis, however, we must find what is the 
commonality underlying these apparent variations. 
With the full range of phenomena that correlate with the occurrence of (i)nka in 
questions/indefinites, we suggest that (i)nka is relativized in terms of the epistemic model, M(i) 
(Giannakidou 1995 et seq.). Extending the notion of referential vagueness (Giannakidou and 
Quer 2013; Giannakidou and Yoon 2016) and non-veridical equilibrium (Giannakidou 2013; 
Giannakidou and Mari 2016), we show how precise such a variation arises by positing distinct 
types of epistemic alternatives that nka and inka introduce—propositional alternatives for nka vs. 
individual alternatives for wh-inka (Kang 2015). The anti-specific indefinite wh-inka imposes a 
homogenous epistemic state for the speaker of the minimal variation: there are at least two 
differing values for the indefinite, and the speaker does not know which value is the actual value. 
On the other hand, the precondition of the propositional alternatives of nka needs a presence of 
heterogeneous modal space. The modal space is partitioned with medium-possibilities of equal 
size. The speaker is undecided as to where the actual world is; therefore it has a reduced truth 
commitment. 
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we explore the properties of the anti-
specific wh-inka and elaborate on our core proposal, including the referential vagueness 
condition. In section 3, we propose an analysis for the paradigm of nka capitalizing on non-
veridical equilibrium. In section 4, we discuss the historical change from C (wh-questions) to the 
non-C element (RVIs). This diachronic development leads us to new insights into the formal 
synchronic analysis, illuminating on the fact that (i)nka is ambiguous between the modalized 
question marker and the anti-specificity marker. We conclude in section 5. 
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2. Referentially vague indefinite wh-inka. In this section, we explore the semantic properties of
wh-inka, as follows: First, a speaker’s indeterminacy of the anti-specific indefinite wh-inka 
comes with the preconditions of the individual alternatives. Second, the precondition of the 
individual alternatives for wh-inka is only a partial variation as opposed to domain 
exhaustification which is the core property of the Free Choice item. 
2.1. EMPIRICAL MOTIVATIONS: WH-SOURCE WITHOUT QUESTION MEANING IN WH-INKA. Since 
languages with wh-indeterminates have a strong tendency to employ question markers, insights 
from Hamblin semantics have induced an equivalent analysis in languages employing overt Q-
markers and other particles in a series of works (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Kratzer 2005, 
a.o.). Kratzer and Shimoyama’s analysis is couched in a semantic framework in which the LF of
a sentence containing wh-indeterminates is formulated by composing propositional alternatives. 
Under this analysis, expressions such as a bare wh-indeterminate in w denote the set of persons 
in w and a verb o- ‘came-in’ denotes the singleton set containing the property of ‘come in.’ Then 
the Point-wise Functional Application rule applies to these denotations, as defined below: 
(3) Point-wise Functional Application (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002): 
If α is a branching node with daughters β and γ, and [[β]]w,g ⊆ Dσ and [[γ]]w,g ⊆ D<σ,τ>, then 
[[α]]w,g = {a ∈ Dγ: ∃b ∃c [b ∈ [[β]]w,g & c ∈ [[γ]]w,g & a = c(b)]}  
Via the Point-wise functional application, the LF of a sentence containing a wh-indeterminate is 
structured by composing propositional alternatives of a higher type, as shown in (4) below.  
(4) [[who-indeterminate came]]w,g = {p: x[person(x)(w) & p = λw’. came(x)(w’)]} 
= {Ann came, Bill came, Charles came…} (for all men in the world of evaluation) 
The propositional alternatives expand until they are closed with a propositional quantiﬁer. Then 
the semantics of the existential is formulated as below, denoting a singleton set of the 
proposition: 
(5)  Where A is a set of the proposition, we have: 
a. [∃](A) = {the proposition that is true in all worlds in which a proposition in A is true}
b. ([[who-indeterminate came]]w,g) = {there is at least one person that came in w}
However, the assumption of the propositional alternatives in the analysis of Korean wh-inka can 
be refuted on empirical grounds. A closer look reveals that wh-inka never receives a wh-question 
meaning. The problem, as illustrated below, is that when wh-inka forms a question, it is 
obligatorily interpreted as a yes-no question. If we follow Hamblin semantics, the existence of 
the Q-particle ni in (6) cannot account for the lack of interpretation of the wh-question: 
(6) Nwukwu-inka  o-ass-ni? 
who-INKA-Nom  come-Past-Q 
‘Did Someone (I don’t know who it is) come in?’ 
‘Who came in?’ 
The puzzle is: how do we explain the lack of interpretation of the wh-question here? Unlike 
English, which employs morphologically distinct lexical items for who and someone, Korean 
employs the same morphological forms for wh-words and the corresponding (in)definites: e.g. 
nwukwu ‘who/someone’. We consider that inka is only combined with the existential wh-
indeterminate nwukwu ‘someone’. RVIs are variables that can be bound by existential closure 
and have a wh-indeﬁnite reading, as represented in (7): 
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(7) [[Did someone come in?]]w =  λp.[p = λw’.x[person(x)(w’) & came-in(x)(w’)]] 
As shown in the denotation in (7), wh-inka is a non-wh-item. The RVI wh-inka and wh-item 
therefore do not have the same source. Given this, Hamblin semantics that rely on the generation 
of propositional alternatives seems to be an unattractive option.  
Here we suggest a different logical schema for wh-indeterminates and proceed with our 
analysis of wh-indeterminates going back to the classical treatment of indeﬁnites as Heimian 
variables. By treating indeterminates as Kamp/Heim-style indeﬁnites, bare wh-words are 
assumed to have a role similar to that of as yet unbound logical variables (à la Nishigauchi1990; 
Cheng and Huang 1996, a.o.). Wh-words do not have an inherent quantiﬁcational force, but the 
particles are the binders, which determine the quantiﬁcational force of the wh-words. The case of 
classical indefinite interpretation of wh-inka can be schematized as follows: 
(8) Q[w,x] [. . . indefinite-D NP (x,w). . . VP] 
The wh-set undergoes operations on the individual domain in accordance with the individual 
based variation. Accordingly, by assuming the wh-indeterminates are equivalent to the Heimian 
indefinites, we can easily explain why wh-indeterminates lack an interrogative meaning. The 
determiner is the place where the speaker’s distinct epistemic state is reflected, and we assume 
that the anti-specificity marker inka, as an operator, directly applies to the indeterminate and 
occupies the D position. 
2.2. MARKEDNESS AND ANTI-SPECIFICITY. It is generally agreed upon that the English indefinite 
article a(n) is unmarked. In fact, it is an unmarked argument marker since it contributes no 
constraints on the variable it introduces. On the other hand, there are marked indefinite Ds with 
which the speaker intends to convey something more than just that the referent of the existential 
indefinite exists. The proliferation of marked indeﬁnite determiners in languages is not 
redundant, but rather an indication that each determiner is the place where the speaker’s 
epistemic state is differentiated. Whereas (9a) with the indefinite article a merely states that one 
student came to see me, and (9b) with a certain/a particular implies that a specific student came 
to see me. The latter has more constrained distribution than the one with the indefinite article a. 
Unlike the unmarked-article-headed indefinite in (9a) which scopes freely, the value of the 
indefinite in (9b) is fixed and the resulting reading is truth-conditionally equivalent to a reading 
where the indefinite has a wide scope: 
(9)  a.   A student came to see me. 
b. A certain/a particular student came to see me.
Modifiers such as a certain and a particular are called specificity markers. These specificity 
markers indicate a rigid reference in the speaker’s mind. On the other hand, some indefinite 
determiners convey information about the speaker’s lack of knowledge since Haspelmath (1997) 
includes (lack of) knowledge of the speaker as one of the possible dimensions of variation within 
the class of indefinites. For example, a wide scope reading is not available for some student in 
(10) since it does not naturally lend itself to a referential use: 
(10)  Some student came to see me. 
This type of lack of specificity is termed anti-specificity. 
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On the nature of (anti-)specific indefinites, Brasoveanu and Farkas (2010) further analyze 
the non-neutral uses of the specificity markers, suggesting the following categories:  
(11)  a.   Family of speciﬁcity markers: Ds that have the semantics of ordinary indeﬁnites + a 
constraint that leads to relative stability of the reference. 
b. Family of anti-speciﬁcity markers: Ds that have the semantics of ordinary indeﬁnites
+ a constraint that leads to relative variability of the reference.
The distinction between specificity and anti-specificity markers depends on the nature of the 
constraint on D, which contributes different values w.r.t. stability/variability of the reference. 
With a use of a morphologically overt D as a specificity marker, in the specific reading, the value 
of the indefinites is fixed and the speaker’s epistemic identifiability is imposed. On the other 
hand, by choosing to use an anti-specific determiner, the speaker ensures that she has no 
particular individual in mind. The value of anti-specific indefinites is not fixed and the speaker’s 
epistemic non-identifiability is reflected. An important question arises at this point: what is 
responsible for the nature of anti-specificity constraints for wh-inka? It is a referentially vague 
indefinite (RVI) that has been argued to be an indicator of the speaker’s epistemic 
indeterminacy/ignorance about the identity of the referent without having a fixed value.  
2.3. NON-IDENTIFIABILITY. In this subsection, we introduce a set of novel data with wh-inka, and 
the referential vagueness condition. Wh-inka is generally associated with the inference that the 
speaker is unable to identify the individual in question. The listener is not allowed to ask for a 
specific value on the reference as seen below: 
(12) A:  Nwukwu-inka cenhwaha-(e)ss-ta. 
who-INKA call-Past-Decl 
  ‘Someone has called.’ 
B:  #Nwukwu-i-ess-ni? 
who-be-Past-Q 
‘Who was it?’ 
The speaker’s ignorance induced by wh-inka is further supported by the following three 
identification methods—naming, ostension and description, that Aloni and Port (2014) suggest. 
As shown below, none of them seem to be compatible with wh-inka: 
(13) Naming 
Na-nun  kyoswu nwukwu-inka-lul manna-kosiph-ta.   
I-Top professor who-INKA-Acc meet-want-Decl 
#kuuy ilum-un con-i-ta. 
his name-Top John-be-Decl 
‘I want to meet some professor or other. #His name is John.’  
(14) Ostension 
Na-nun   kyoswu nwukwu-inka-lul manna-kosiph-ta. 
I-Top professor who-INKA-Acc meet-want-Decl 
#Kukes-un  ceki ce namca-ta. 
it-Top there that guy-Decl 
‘I want to meet some professor or other. #It’s that guy over there.’ 
(15)  Description 
Na-nun   kyoswu  nwukwu-inka-lul manna-kosiph-ta. 
I-Top  professor who-INKA-Acc meet-want-Decl 
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#ku-nun  pwulkun meli-ta. 
he-Top  red haired-Decl 
‘I want to meet some professor or other. #He is red haired.’ 
The sentences from (13) to (15) exemplify the cases where wh-inka carries the uncertainty 
implication that the speaker does not have a particular (i.e. identifiable) referent in mind. The 
second sentences in each set of data introduce a specific value. When the speaker knows what 
the target value is, the use of the wh-inka becomes odd. This difference exactly parallels with 
what we find with algún in Spanish, kápjos/kanenas in Greek and wh-rato in Korean 
(Giannakidou and Quer 2013; Giannakidou and Yoon 2016).  
Another set of empirical data supporting the account of referential vagueness comes from 
the interaction with intentional operators. As shown below, a bare wh-item gives rise to the 
interpretation of either de re or de dicto as in (16) while a reading of wh-inka only yields to de 
dicto as in (17): 
(16) a.  Mary-nun  uysa  nwukwu-hako kyelhonha-ko sipehan-ta. 
Mary-Top  doctor  who/someone-with marry-Comp  want-Decl 
b. de re: [∃x in w0 WANT (marry (x at w0))]
c. de dicto: [WANT [∃w∃x doctor(x,w)  marry (x at w)]]
(17)  a.   Mary-nun  uysa nwukwu-inka-hako kyelhonha-ko  sipehan-ta. 
Mary -Top doctor  who/someone-INKA-with marry-Comp  want-Decl 
b. de dicto: [WANT [∃w∃x doctor(x,w)  marry (x at w)]]
Given the discussion so far, we propose that the RVI wh-inka has the core properties of 
referential vagueness, as follows:  
(18)  Properties of the RVI wh-inka: 
a. Wh-inka is indeﬁnite;
b. Wh-inka takes a narrow scope with respect to intentional/modal operators;
c. Wh-inka signals the speaker’s indeterminacy concerning the identity of the mentioned
referent.
The speaker does not have a particular referent in mind, which reflects the epistemic judgment of 
uncertainty: it requires that the speaker be in a state of uncertainty on the value of the indefinite. 
The notion of a non-fixed value constraint is subject to anti-specificity, which is sensitive to the 
knowledge of the speaker.  
2.4. NON-EXHAUSTIVE VARIATION. In this subsection, we compare the two types of Korean anti-
specific indefinites: indefinite RVI wh-inka vs. FCI wh-na. We show how FCIs and RVIs bring 
about their distinct properties regarding the (non-)exhaustive variation in imperatives and 
universal modals. The free choice effect is stronger than referential vagueness in the sense that 
FCIs exhaust all values in the given domain while RVIs do not. Here we compare Korean data 
with Giannakidou and Quer’s (2013) examples with Greek and Spanish RVIs in order to show 
that the effect is strikingly parallel, which supports our assumption that Korean wh-inka is 
equivalent to the RVIs in these languages.  
First, let’s observe deontic universal modals where the FCIs are infelicitous: 
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Context: The family is in a dire ﬁnancial situation and Mary must save face for the family by 
marrying a rich guy. Lawyers are rich guys, so she needs to marry some lawyer or other, a 
member of the set ‘lawyer’. 
(19) a.  #I Maria prepi na pandrefti opjondhipote dhikighoro.    [Greek] 
 b.   #Maria-nun pyenhosa nwukwu-na-hako kyelhonhay-yaha-n-ta. [Korean] 
         Mary-Top  lawyer   who-or-with  marry-must-Pres-Decl 
        ‘lit. Maria must marry any lawyer.’      
 
The presupposition imposes that there will be a value for FCI ‘any lawyer’ in each w we 
consider. The result is an undesirably strong statement because Maria cannot marry all the 
lawyers. In contrast, the use of the RVI in this context is felicitous: 
 
Context: same as above. 
(20)  a.   I Maria prepi na pandrefti kapjon dhikighoro.     [Greek] 
 b.   Maria-nun  pyenhosa  nwukwu-inka-hako  kyelhonhay-yaha-n-ta. [Korean] 
   Maria-Top   lawyer   who-INKA-with  marry-must-Pres-Decl 
   ‘Maria must marry some lawyer or other.’     
 
The sentence becomes plausible in this case since Maria needs to marry some lawyer or other, a 
member of the set lawyer, without having to run all the values in the set.  
Likewise, in epistemic necessity modals, we get a similar contrast: 
 
Context: I am talking with John and I see that he is very informed about Mary’s illness. 
(21)  a.   (Tha) prepi na milise me {kapjon/#opjondhipote} giatro.  [Greek] 
 b.   Ku-nun uysa   nwukwu-{inka/#na}-hako iyakiha-nkey [Korean] 
   he-Top  doctor  who-INKA-with   talk-Rel     
   pwunmyengha-ta.                       
   must-Decl         
   ‘He must have talked with {some doctor or other/*any doctor}.’    
 
The FCI nwukwu-na creates an excessively strong statement that forces John to have to talk to 
every doctor in the hospital; in order to be informed about one’s illness you do not have to talk 
with all doctors. 
Second, let’s consider invitations and suggestions. FCIs and RVIs influence these contexts 
in different ways:  
 
Context: A variety of delicious desserts are presented at the buffet in front of Maria. But she does 
not have much of an appetite. A says:  
(22)  FCIs: 
 a.  Fae opjodhipote ghiliko!       [Greek] 
 b.  Prueba cualquier dulce!       [Spanish] 
 c.  Kwaca mwues-ina  tusey-yo.     [Korean] 
   cookie what-NA   eat-Imp 
   ‘Eat all of these cookies!’ 
(23)  RVIs: 
 a.   Fae kanena ghiliko/kanena ap’afta ta ghiliko    [Greek] 
 b.   Prueba algn dulce/alguno de estos dulces!     [Spanish] 
 c.  Kwaca mwues-inka-lul  tusey-yo.     [Korean] 
   cookie what-INKA-Acc    eat-Imp 
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   ‘Eat some (or other) of these cookies!’ 
 
Note the different situations between the FCI vs. RVI-imperatives in (22) and (23). The contrast 
in interpretations, i.e. exhaustive and non-exhaustive variations induced by FCIs and RVIs, 
respectively, reveal that FCIs and RVIs show different behaviors with respect to domain 
exhaustification. With the FCI in (22), we have a strong imperative to eat as many cookies as the 
addressee wants; we exhaust all available values in the domain of quantification. With the RVI in 
(23), on the other hand, the imperatives are gentle invitations to eat some sweet or other. In 
uttering the sentence, the speaker is not inviting the addressee to consider all sweets; she is only 
inviting the addressee to consider some and try. In this sense, RVIs do not exhaust the domain. 
What they require is only partial variation in their domain.  
2.5. REFERENTIAL VAGUENESS OF WH-INKA. Given the discussion so far, we propose that the 
referential vagueness of wh-inka is defined as follows: 
 
(24) RVI wh-inka: 
A sentence of the form λw.[[VP(α)]]c,w where α is a singular indefinite containing inka, 
expresses a proposition only on those utterance context c where the following conditions 
are fulfilled: 
        a.  Non-identifiability: 
λw.[[VP(α)]]c,w is defined for a given context c, iff the speaker s of c is unable to 
identify a referentially vague variable of α 
        b.   Referential vagueness  
   ∃w1,w2 ∈ W: [[α]]w1 ≠ [[α]]w2; 
[[wh-inka came]] will be defined in c, only if: ∃w1,w2 ∈ W: [[α]]w1≠ [[α]]w2; where 
α is the referentially vague variable; 
if defined, [[wh-inka came]] is true if there is at least one assignment g that verifies 
the condition someone (x) & came (x).  
 
By using RVI wh-inka, the speaker intends to refer to a vague individual in the world of 
utterance. It is available because the speaker believes there is more than one value and the wh-
inka receives distinct values in the contextual domain. This definition imposes a weaker demand 
on the context in which there are simply at least two alternative worlds where the RVI wh-inka 
receives distinct values. This is equivalent to the sentences with a plain indefinite—but we still 
need to capture the referential vagueness effect of the existential-like quantification. This effect 
is a presupposition of a non-exhaustive variation that the RVI, but not the regular indefinite, 
gives rise to. These individual alternatives are determined by the denotation of the wh-words 
within the set of worlds compatible with the speaker’s belief in the world of evaluation, which is 
equivalent to the speaker’s epistemic state. Building on Giannakidou (1999, 2009), we model an 
individual’s epistemic state as a set of doxastic alternatives, called a belief model, i.e. a function 
that gives a set of possible worlds compatible with what x, the bearer of the attitude, believes in 
the actual world: 
 
(25) Belief model of an individual (Giannakidou 1999: (45)) 
 Let c = <cg(c), W(c), M, s, h, w0, f,…> be a context. 
 A model MB(x)  M is a set of world associations with an individual x representing world  
 compatible with what x believes. 
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(26) a.   John won the race. 
 b.   [John won the race] = 1 iff 
   ∀w[w ∈ MB(s) → w ∈ λwʹ′.John wins the race in wʹ′] 
 
If the RVI nwukwu-inka ‘someone (I don’t know who it is)’ is assigned a non-fixed value, i.e. in 
the narrow scope with respect to the attitude, we may have different visitors in each world: 
 
(27) No particular individual in mind = no fixed value in MB(s):  
 w1 → John, w2 → Bill, w3 → Charles ... 
The worlds w1, w2 are epistemic alternatives of the speaker: w1,w2  M(speaker), where 
M(speaker) is the speaker’s belief state, the set of worlds compatible with what he or she 
believes/knows. 
 
Via the individual anchor, the belief worlds are available as a parameter of evaluation. Variation 
is modeled as different values in at least two worlds.  
3. Modalized question marker nka. In section 3, we show that nka is a special subtype of the 
epistemic subjunctive, which indicates an epistemic possibility. The semantic contribution of nka 
presupposes the presence of heterogeneous epistemic space. We offer a precise way of capturing 
the epistemic possibility by nonveridicality—but also showing that the nonveridicality needed is 
of the weakest form, corresponding to non-veridical equilibrium (Giannakidou 2013; 
Giannakidou and Mari 2016).  
3.1. NKA IN SUBORDICATE CLAUSES. In this subsection, we discuss the behavior of nka in certain 
embedded contexts. Given the set of empirical data, we argue that nka is sensitive to 
nonveridicality, in the sense that it does not entail the truth of the propositions in subordinate 
clauses. First, the addition of nka produces a weakening, nonveridicality effect.  As shown 
below, the nka collocating with po ‘see’ gives rise to the meaning of ‘it seems that:’ 
 
(28) Con-i   (ama)  wusungca-i-nka po-ta. 
 John-Nom  maybe winner-be-NKA see-Decl 
 ‘lit. It seems that John is the winner.’ 
 
Furthermore, when nka combines with a morphologically negative verb like mol ‘not know,’ it 
gives rise to a dubitative reading: 
 
(29)  B-ka   mac-nun  tap-i-nka mol-la.  
 B-Nom  correct-Rel answer-be-NKA not.know-Decl 
 (ama)  tap-un A-ilkes-i-ta. 
 maybe  answer-Top A-might-be-Decl 
 ‘I doubt if it is a correct answer. The answer is probably A.’ 
 
Such a dubitative reading typically involves the subjunctive mood since it is related to the 
speaker’s commitment with regard to irrelis. It is further supported by the fact that nka sentences 
are compatible with probability adverbs like ama(to) ‘probably’ above, but incompatible with 
necessity adverbs such as pwunmyenghi ‘certainly:’ 
 
(30)  B-ka    mac-nun  tap-i-nka mol-la.  
 This    correct-Rel answer-be-NKA not know-Decl 
 #pwunmyenghi tap-un  A-ilkes-i-ta. 
 certainly  answer-Top A-might-be-Decl 
 ‘I doubt if it is the correct answer. The answer will certainly be A.’ 
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The nonveridical nature of the Korean MQ is further shown by considering what kind of 
predicates normally combine with it. Indicative predicates such as assertive, epistemic, factive, 
and semi-factive verbs are incompatible with MQ: 
 
(31)   Verbs that do not combine with the MQs: indicative in Korean (Yoon 2013:(48a-d)) 
a.   assertive: malha ‘say’, ilk ‘read’, cwucangha ‘claim’ 
b.   epistemics: mit ‘believe’ 
c.   factive verbs: kippu ‘glad’, al ‘know’, hwuhyoha ‘regret’ 
d.   semi-factives: kkaytat ‘discover’, kiekha ‘remember’ 
 
Rather, verbs that combine with nka are characterized as verbs of uncertainty, i.e. ones that do 
not combine with nonveridicals (Yoon 2011, 2013): 
 
(32)   Verbs that do not combine with MQs: subjunctives in Korean (Yoon 2013:(49a-d)) 
a.   volitional: hyimangha ‘hope’, kitayha ‘hope’ 
b.   verbs of fear: twuryeweha ‘fear’, kekcengha ‘worry’ 
c.   directives: chwungkoha ‘advise’, ceyanha ‘suggest’ 
d.   verbs of uncertainty: moru ‘not;know’, kwungkumha ‘wonder’ 
 
Again, it supports our claim that nka does not entail the truth of the proposition in a subordinate 
clause and reduces the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the sentence. In what follows, we 
show that the uncertainty may originate from the subject’s presumption of the non-high 
possibility of the proposition given by contextually available information. 
3.2. MEDIUM POSSIBILITY OF MQ. Thus far, we have observed that nka in MQs implicates that a 
subject is uncertain as to whether the propositional content is possible or not. It is further 
evidenced by the fact that an MQ with nka is infelicitous in contexts with high possibility and 
low possibility, while felicitous in contexts with medium possibility: 
 
(33)    imsin-i-nka? 
 pregnancy-be-NKA 
 ‘Is it possibly a pregnancy?’ 
(34)  MQ and Degree of Certainty 
a.   High-possibility context (80-100%): It has been 1 year since my sister got married. 
One day, I visited her. She wanted to tell me about the surprise news. She showed me 
her pregnancy test. There were two lines on it. I say:  continuation (33): # 
b.   Medium-possibility context (50%): It has been 1 year since my sister got married. 
One day, I visited her. She showed some symptoms that she was suffering from 
morning sickness, and craved eating something sour. I say:  continuation by (33): o.k. 
c.   Low-possibility context (0-20%): High-likelihood context (80-100%): It has been 1 
year since my sister got married. One day, I visited her. She told me that she wants a 
baby.  I say: continuation by (33): # 
 
The example in (34) suggests that in order for nka to be felicitous, the speaker must believe that 
the realization of the propositional content has a medium possibility. The context is set up such 
that the speaker is uncertain about the truth of the proposition expressed by the sentence: the 
speaker does not know which of p (she is pregnant) and non-p (she is not pregnant) is true. 
However, if the evidence points too strongly, as in (34a), or too weakly, as in (34c), in favor of 
the proposition being true, nka becomes infelicitous. The contribution of nka thus involves 
medium certainty. By using MQ, a speaker presupposes the medium possibility of realization of 
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the propositional content. We can further argue that having 50% certainty can naturally be 
explained if the core reanalysis of nka necessarily occurs in a statement whose meaning consists 
of both p and non-p. The speaker’s presupposition on the medium possibility of the realization of 
the propositional content, we argue, is the reason why nka is used. 
3.3. NON-VERIDICAL EQUILIBRIUM OF MQ. Our proposal is that the semantic contribution of nka 
is to function as a nonveridical commitment-weakening operator and gives rise to the speaker’s 
weakest commitment. We suggest that the precondition of nka comes with two main parts: (i) the 
epistemic constraints of the MQ marker can be achieved by means of the presence of the non-
veridical modal space; and (ii) this modal space is partitioned in the equipoised epistemic space. 
Nonveridicality is placed at the heart of modality mood (Giannakidou 1995 et seq.). 
Giannakidou assumes Kratzerian semantics for all modals, where modals take modal bases and 
ordering sources, and add one ingredient, the Nonveridicality Axiom, which all modal bases are 
nonveridical.1 As shown below, nonveridicality is a precondition on modalities, where 
nonveridical domains are sets of worlds partitioned into p and non-p worlds: 
 
(35)  The Nonveridicality Axiom of modals (Giannakidou and Mari 2016: (27)): 
MODAL(M)(p) can be defined only if the modal base M is nonveridical, i.e. only if M 
contains p and non-p worlds.   
 
This axiom guarantees that MODAL p will not entail p, since there are p worlds in M, and the 
actual world may be one of those. The modal base M intersects with p, but also contains non-p 
worlds. The modal is biased when it delivers a positive bias: if the set of p worlds is larger than 
the set of non-p worlds. Existential modals do not have bias and their modal base is partitioned 
into p and non-p sets of equal size (i.e. nonveridical equilibrium; Giannakidou 2013). The 
                                                
1 Here we introduce the fundamental notions of the nonveridical modal. First, ordering sources and Best worlds are 
defined in the sense of Portner (2009) as follows: 
 
(1) Ordering of worlds (Portner 2009, p.65): 
 For any set of propositions X and any worlds w,v: w <X v iff 
 (i) for all p ∈ X, if v ∈ p, then w ∈ p; and  
(ii) for some q ∈ X, w ∈ q and v ∉ q 
 
Second, given an epistemic modal base M(i), the best option is defined as a function over M(i): 
 
 (2)  For any set of propositions X, the best option for worlds is a function over M(i) (Giannakidou & Mari 
2016: (30)): 
 BestSM(i) = {w’ ∈ M(i): ∀q ∈ X(w’ ∈ q)} 
 
Third, the best worlds consist of two basic parts: support and bias. The support function takes the modal base as its 
argument and returns a subset of it. The set of worlds returned is such that the propositions in the ordering source S 
are true.  
 
(3)  Support function (Giannakidou & Mari 2016: (31)): 
 SupportSM(i) = X s.t. X ⊂ M(i) & ∀w’ ∈ X: p(w’) 
 
The support set is the inner domain of the modal base, and the modal base is its outer domain. The support function 
delivers the positive set of the nonveridical modal base. Bias is defined in terms of a measure function µ, which 
takes sets as arguments and returns their sizes.  
 
(4)  A modal is biased iff (Giannakidou & Mari 2016: (32)): 
µ(SupportS(M(i)) > µM(i)) \ (SupportS(M(i))) 
 
The modal is biased when it delivers positive bias: if the set of p worlds is larger than the set of ¬p worlds.  
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nonveridical equilibrium is a state of fifty-fifty and p and non-p are equal options. The 
nonveridical equilibrium can be generalized as follows: 
  
(36) Nonveridical equilibrium (general) (Giannakidou and Mari 2016: (34)) 
 Let X s.t. X ⊂ M(i). 
 A modal base M(i) is a non-veridical equilibrium iff µ(X) ≈ µ(M(i) \ X) 
 
The nonveridical modal base of nka-p holds the non-veridical modal space, partitioned in 
equipoise that are compatible with the speaker’s belief, and indicates an equal possibility of its 
spaces given what the speaker’s doxastic (or belief) world is: i.e. nka conveys that the speaker 
considers both p sets and non-p sets equally possible.  
Epistemic modality specifies the degree of a speaker’s certainty about a proposition in 
questions. The commonality between nka and the epistemic modal might is that they both 
express that a proposition is held in at least one of the speaker’s doxastic alternatives. The 
speaker must believe that the proposition is a possibility given what she knows to be true. We 
thus suggest that an appropriate interpretation of nka is obtained by considering the epistemic 
status of the speaker. It is characterized as equipoised epistemic space. 
 
(37) Non-veridical equilibrium of a modalized question  
 
 
 µ(X)              µ(M(i) \ X) 




(38)  [[NKA(p)]]M,i will be defined if only if  
 (i)  the modal base M(i) is nonveridical; 
 (ii)  ∃X ⊂ M(i) s.t. µ(X) ≈ µ(M(i) \ X) (nonveridical equilibrium) 
 if defined, [[NKA(p)]]M,i = 1 iff ∀w’ ∈ X s.t. X ⊂ M(i)  
 
The speaker has reduced the truth commitment by creating a nonveridical modal space: i.e. one 
that contains p and non-p worlds. The domains of non-veridical equilibrium are modal domains 
partitioned into p and non-p worlds. Unlike the typical partition, which is the result of an 
ordering (e.g. ordering sources with modals), we show that there is no best world in nka 
questions hence no ordering occurs.  
4. Path to grammaticalization of referentially vague indefinites: from question to indefinite. 
It has been argued that inka went through grammaticalization and was reanalyzed as a single 
nominal particle (i.e. determiner) from the MQ marker nka (Yoon 2005). In this subsection, we 
investigate the sources of the RVI wh-inka, and examine their development from Old Korean 
into Modern Korean, including their spread into new environments and the development of its 
ignorance component. We show that wh-inka has historically undergone a reanalysis from C (i.e. 
wh-questions: wh-i-nka ‘wh-be-Q’) to non-C elements (i.e. referentially vague indefinites: wh-
inka ‘wh-INKA’). An understanding of these diachronic developments leads us to new insights 
into the formal synchronic analysis.  
Until the end of the 19th century, wh-phrases such as nwukwu ‘who’ in Korean were used 
exclusively as interrogative pronouns and only in questions. What the data in Modern Korean 
suggest is that the distribution of nwukwu, for some reason, has been extended to non-
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interrogative contexts. This means that the properties of wh-words in Korean have changed over 
time from the exclusively interrogative pronouns to quantificational indefinite pronouns. The 
distribution of wh-phrases in Modern Korean has been extended to non-interrogative contexts 
(C-M Suh 1987, Kim 1992, a.o.). To explain the extension, it can be assumed that Q-morphemes 
lost their syntactic status as interrogative C and underwent reanalysis to non-C elements with 
varying quantificational forces such as an existential quantifier (Kim 1992). This change, in turn, 
would have had the consequence of allowing wh-phrases to appear in genuinely non-
interrogative contexts. According to this hypothesis, the sequence of changes must have 
proceeded in the following order (Yoon 2005: (43)): 
 
(38) a.   wh-QPs like nwukwu-inka lost their clausal identities. 
b.   inka was reanalyzed as the existential quantiﬁer. 
c.   wh-words like nwukwu were reanalyzed as not exclusively interrogative. 
d.   wh-words like nwukwu came to be used as a bare indeﬁnite pronoun. 
 
The idea is that although Q-morphemes historically were all Cs, some of them lost their syntactic 
status as C and were reanalyzed as non-C elements with varying quantiﬁcational forces. Now 
they can be used in both interrogative and non-interrogative contexts: when they are associated 
with an interrogative C, they are interpreted as interrogative pronouns, while when they are 
associated with an existential quantiﬁcational inka, they read as an existential pronoun.  
With this background, we can further argue that the change of wh-words from interrogative 
to indeﬁnite pronouns with quantiﬁcational variability can be naturally explained if the core 
reanalysis of wh-QPs like nwukwu-inka is from an interrogative C to an RVI-marker. Wh-inka, 
which had an interrogative C before the reanalysis, now has an existential quantiﬁcational force 
as an RVI. The reanalysis of wh-inka that triggered such a change, we propose, is as follows:  
 
(39)  wh-questions > RVIs 
Stage Conceptual schema Function 
Stage 1 X encodes a 
equipoised partition on 
the proposition 
MQ-marker 
Stage 2 X encodes the 
speaker’s  
epistemic uncertainty 
on the reference 
Anti-specificity marker 
 
Table 1: Semantic change of (i)nka 
 
In the historical reanalysis process, the original properties of a construction before the reanalysis 
may continue to constrain the use of the reanalyzed forms (Hopper and Traugott 2003). This can 
account for why the indeﬁnite wh-inka conveys the speaker’s ignorance: the speaker’s ignorance 
induced by the RVI wh-inka came from the MQ, which is based on the original properties of a 
construction prior to the reanalysis. Therefore, the reanalyzed RVIs headed by the particle inka, 
which was originally a MQ, are unnatural in a situation where the speaker knows the identity of 
the referent. 
5. Conclusions. In this paper, we suggest a novel paradigm of the split epistemic ignorance, 
based on two particles in Korean: the anti-specificity marker inka in wh-indefinites vs. the 
epistemic subjunctive marker nka in modalized questions. We showed that inka and nka are 
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distinct lexical items, introducing individual and propositional alternatives, respectively. A 
theoretical implication of the current study is then that the Korean facts bring a fresh perspective 
with regard to the notion of the speaker’s uncertainty over the epistemic space. We suggest the 
necessity of a strict dichotomy of epistemic ignorance which gives rise to the differing semantics 
of referential vagueness and nonveridical equilibrium.  
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